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We  investigate  experimentally  the  impact  of  unflattering  social  comparisons  on 
individuals’  behaviour.  More  precisely,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  the 
satisfaction subjects derive from social comparisons and subjects’ decisions to reduce 
others’  income.  In  our  experiment,  subjects  are  randomly  paired  and  receive  an 
endowment. Then subjects have to report their satisfaction level after being informed of 
their own endowment and of their opponent’s endowment. Then they can choose, or 
not, to reduce their opponent’s endowment incurring a personal cost. We observe: (1) 
most  people  report  their  satisfaction  to  be  negatively  affected  by  learning  others’ 
endowments; (2)  destructive decisions are  predominantly undertaken by dissatisfied 
subjects;  (3)  satisfaction  is  negatively  affected  by  absolute  difference  (difference 
between subjects’ endowments measured in absolute terms) and (4) relative difference 
between subjects’ endowments modulates subjects’ negative behaviour. 
 
 
Key  words:    Subjective  well-being,  Interdependent  preferences,  Envy,  Destruction, 
Income Inequality, Social Comparison, Self-report. 
JEL classification: D6, H0, J0. 
                                                           
1 LAMETA, University of Montpellier, France. Mail: jeremy.celse@lameta.univ-montp1.fr . Phone: + 33 (0)4 67 
15 83 22. 
 The author thanks Dimitri Dubois for programming the software and for his numerous advices. The author also 
thanks  Mélanie  Heugues  for  her  unconditional  support  and  for  precious  advices  freely  given.  This  paper 
benefited comments from Mickaël Beaud, Thierry Blayac, Stephane Mussard, Raphaël Soubeyran, Angela Sutan 
and Marc Willinger. The author does not forget Patricia Modat for readings. Financial support from the regional 
council of the Reunion’s island. 1. Introduction 
 
Do you prefer to earn more than your colleagues even if it implies to receive a fewer absolute annual 
income  or  to  earn  a  higher  absolute  income  but  less  than  your  colleagues?  When  Solnick  and 
Hemenway (1998) asked subjects to answer to that question they observed that  the majority of 
subjects (56%) chose to be above average even if it implies receiving a smaller wage.  By choosing to 
be above average, subjects clearly refused Pareto optimal situations. So a negative behaviour is not 
an isolated phenomenon, many recent experiments (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Beckman et al., 2002; 
Abbink et al., 2008) support this observation. Are social comparisons so important for subjects that 
they exert individuals to behave negatively albeit they incur a personal loss? 
Standard economic theory relies on the basic model of the Homo Economicus which assumes that an 
agent’s  utility  depends  exclusively  on  his  own  level  of  consumption  and  leisure.  Therefore  the 
situation of other agents (and hence their income) does not exert an influence on individual situation 
and  more  precisely  on  individual  well-being.  Running  counter  the  Homo  Economicus’  concept, 
several authors have claimed that agents take into consideration others’ situation when evaluating 
their well-being. Hence social comparisons may drive to different issues and effects. On the one hand 
social comparisons might have a negative effect on individual well-being (Veblen, 1909; Duesenberry, 
1949). So a negative effect can be the result of experiencing negative emotions such as jealousy or 
envy. On the other hand social comparisons might have a positive effect on individual well-being 
(Becker, 1991). Altruistic feelings, such as intergenerational solidarity and charity, might be held 
responsible for that latter point. By introducing the concept of interdependent preferences, scholars 
underlined the fact that social comparisons are inherent to human nature and hence, may exert an 
impact  on  individual  well-being.  An  agent  exhibits  interdependent  preferences  when  his  utility 
depends not only on his own situation but also on that of other agents. Hence an agent whose 
satisfaction depends both on his situation and on others’ situations is said to exhibit interdependent 
preferences. 
An increasing number of studies support the impact of social comparisons on individual well-being 
and thus the existence of interdependent preferences. Easterlin (1995) revealed that well-being is 
not entirely shaped by individual income and leisure by conveying a paradox between income and 
happiness
2. The author observed that relative income (i.e. how much an agent earns in comparison 
to others) is more important than absolute income (i.e. how much an agent earns in absolute terms) 
in determining individual well-being. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) provided a direct example of 
interdependent preferences. Using a national longitudinal survey of youth, they ob served that the 
probability that a woman is employed depends positively and significantly on her sister-in-law being 
employed. The most surprising result arises from that currently married women with non-employed 
sisters tend to participate more in the lab our market when the income of their sister’s husband is 
larger  than  her  own  husband’s.  Clark  and  Oswald  (1996)  estimated  a  job  satisfaction  equation 
referring on the British Household Panel Survey. They observed that both individual income and 
one’s reference group income have the same coefficient. Nevertheless whereas individual income 
attracts a positive coefficient, one’s reference group income catches a negative coefficient. Their 
                                                           
2 This paradox can be summarized by the following quotation: “Raising the income of all does not increase the 
happiness of all” (Easterlin, 1995, p. 44). results  suggest  that  job  satisfaction  is  entirely  relative
3.  In  line  with   previous  work,  Ferrer-i-
Carbonnell (2005), using German Panel, revealed that an agent’s life satisfaction decreases with the 
income of the agent’s reference group
4. More recently, Bault et al. (2008) have examined the impact 
of social comparisons on a subject’s satisfaction by asking to the subject to evaluate and report his 
subjective feelings on the outcome of a gamble. The authors implemented different conditions: one-
player  condition  and  two-player  condition.  In  the  one-player  condition,  subjects  were  informed 
about the payoff obtained with the gamble they chose and the payoff they could have obtained by 
choosing the other gamble. This one-player condition was implemented in order to identify the 
affective consequences of private emotions (regret and joy). In the two-player condition, subjects 
were informed about the payoff resulting from the gamble they chose and about the payoff another 
subject  received  by  choosing  a  gamble.  The  two-player  condition  supplied  information  on  the 
affective effects of social emotions (envy and gloating). The authors underlined the key role of social 
comparisons by observing that social emotions (i.e. subjective feelings experienced in the two-player 
condition) were experienced more intensively by subjects than private ones. Furthermore, situations 
when the subject received a fewer payoff than his opponent was experienced, by the subject, has the 
worst situation. Hence, others’ income seems to affect individual well-being and satisfaction. 
As mentioned previously, Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005) exposed that, in some cases, agents 
are prone to renounce to a certain amount of a specific good and thus to receive less of that good 
just because others will receive more than them
5. In another experiment, Beckman et al. (2002) 
provided experimental evidences that social emotions, more precisely envy and malice
6 are powerful 
micro-motivations and might explain why individuals refuse Pareto efficient distributions. Zizzo and 
Oswald (2001) wanted to provide an experimental test for negatively interdependent preferences by 
observing if people were willing to destroy others’ incomes even if they incurred a personal cost. The 
game consisted in two steps. In the first step, every subject began with a betting stage which was 
implemented  in  order  to  create  unequal  wealth  distributions.  At  the  end  of  the  betting  stage, 
subjects could reduce others’ money (“burning” decisions) although reducing the income of others is 
costly
7. The authors observed that “burning” is substantial: the majority of subjects (62.5%) chose to 
“burn” others’ incomes. Nevertheless although this study provides interesting results it does not 
allow  the  authors  to  conclude  about  the  impact  of  interdependent  preferences  (i.e.  social 
comparisons) on subjects’ behaviour. Indeed, as subjects were associated to other participants they 
had  to  face  decisions  stemming  from  them.  As  a  consequence  subjects  could  have  adopted  a 
strategic  behaviour:  they decided  to  reduce others’  income  in  order to  retaliate  against others’ 
                                                           
3 By aiming to investigate the neurobiological basis of social comparisons, Fliessbach et al. (2007) observed that 
the ventral striatum (i.e. a brain area known for being involved in the reward-process) is strongly connected to 
relative  payments.  Indeed  BOLD  (Blood  Oxygenation  Level  Dependent)  responses  increased  with  the  ratio 
between  a  subject’s  reward  and  the  opponent’s  reward.  The  BOLD  signal  reflects  the  neural  activity  by 
measuring the changes in blood flow. This result might be interpreted as an evidence that relative comparison 
does not dependent on the absolute level of payments but rather on relative payment. 
4 See Senik (2005) for an extensive review of the existing literature. 
5 See also Frank (1997), Frank and Sunstein (2001) and Lehmann (2001), Grolleau et al. (2008) and Grolleau and 
Said (2009). 
6  Envy (resp.  malice) was defined, by the authors, as the opposition to Pareto improvement when the 
improvement aimed at a subject occupying a superior (resp. inferior) position. 
7 The cost of “burning” (i.e. reducing others’ income) varies among treatments from 0.02 to 0.25 experimental 
monetary units (i.e. for a price of 0.25 m. u the subject have to give up 25 cents in order to reduce 1 dollar of 
another money). “burning” decisions they anticipated. Bosman and van Winden (2002) focused their attention on how 
emotions triggered by others’ decisions can exert a subject to destroy one’s income in a power-to-
take game. The authors revealed that emotions could exert an influence on subjects’ behaviour. 
More precisely, they observed that 1) others’ decisions have a great and significant impact on a 
subject’s  probability  to  destroy  income,  2)  a  subject’s  emotions  are  deeply  affected  by  others’ 
decisions, 3) negative emotions (in particular irritation and contempt) drive to destruction.  
In  conclusion,  two  different  lines  of  research  can be  sketched.  On  the  one  hand  researches on 
happiness conveyed that social comparisons are important and have a significant effect on individual 
well-being  and  thus  on  satisfaction.  According  to  their  results,  the  existence  of  interdependent 
preferences  cannot  be  ignored.  On  the  other  hand  recent  experimental  studies  showed  that 
individuals  could  behave  negatively  even  by  incurring  a  personal  cost.  Moreover  these  studies 
suggested  that  emotions,  and  more  precisely  social  emotions  (i.e.  emotions  triggered  by  social 
comparisons),  might  induce  subjects’  behaviour.  Indeed  some  studies  conveyed  that  specific 
emotions could exert subjects to engage specific actions. Nevertheless no study, to our knowledge, 
has investigated the relationship between social comparisons (i.e. interdependent preferences) and 
behaviour
8. Relying on quoted studies, we know that others’ situations affect individual satisfaction 
and we also know that emotions generate specific behaviour. Then it would be tempting to argue 
that social comparisons affect individuals’ behaviour by influencing their satisfaction. Besides we still 
ignore if interdependent preferences (i.e. social comparisons) can exert individuals to engage specific 
behaviour such as reducing others’ income or refusing Pareto improvements. We aim at bridging the 
gap between these two lines of research by exploring the full link between social comparisons and 
individual behaviour through the concept of interdependent preferences. The remaining question is 
now  the  following:  Can  social  comparisons  affect  individuals’  behaviour  by  inducing  subjects  to 
undertake specific actions?  
Do social comparisons (and thus interdependent preferences) affect individual behaviour, i.e. induce 
individuals  to  adopt  a  specific  behaviour?  We  implement  an  experimental  protocol  in  order  to 
investigate  whether  social  comparisons  change  subjects’  satisfaction  and  to  determine  if  these 
changes can explain subjects’ decisions to undertake a negative action, such as reducing others’ 
income. We aim at revealing directly the existence and the nature of interdependent preferences by 
asking  to  the  subject  how  satisfied  (resp.  dissatisfied)  he  feels  after  being  informed  of  his 
endowment  and  then  if  his  satisfaction  (resp.  dissatisfaction)  has  changed  after  learning  the 
endowment allowed to another person (opponent afterwards) and hence his own inferior position. 
If, as predicted by standard economic theory, an agent is indifferent between his own situation and 
his  opponent’s  situation  thus  his  satisfaction  (resp.  dissatisfaction)  would  not  be  affected  after 
learning  his  opponent’s  allocation.  By  reporting  changes  in  his  satisfaction  after  learning  the 
opponent’s endowment, a subject is said to manifest interdependent preferences. A subject exhibits 
positive interdependent preferences if his satisfaction (resp. dissatisfaction) is larger (resp. smaller) 
after  being  informed  of  his  opponent’s  payoff.  On  the  contrary  an  agent  exhibits  negative 
interdependent  preferences  if  he  is  less  satisfied  (resp.  more  dissatisfied)  after  knowing  his 
opponent’s payoff. In our paper, we are only interested in revealing interdependent preferences 
                                                           
8 More recently some experiments tried to investigate how social comparisons influence subjects’ decisions in a 
Gift-Exchange  game  (Gächter  et  al,  2008;  Thöni  and  Gächter,  2009;  Mittone  and  Ploner,  2009)  or  in  an 
Ultimatum game (Knez and Camerer, 1995; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004, Alewell and Nicklish, 2009). But 
these studies did not isolate the impact of social comparisons on individual behaviour. when  the  subject  makes  unflattering  social  comparisons,  i.e.  when  the  subject’s  endowment  is 
inferior to his opponent’s one
9. Again we are exclusively interested in one type of behaviour: the 
negative behaviour resulting from reducing the opponent’s endowment.  
Additionally, we aim at studying the impact of absolute difference (i.e. difference between subjects’ 
endowments measured in absolute terms) and relative difference (i.e. difference between subjects’ 
endowments measured in relative terms) on both interdependent preferences and on decisions to 
undertake  negative  actions.  We  want  to  examine  whether  absolute  and/or  relative  difference 
modulate  interdependent  preferences  and  subjects’  decisions  to  reduce  others’  income.  There 
seems to be, in happiness studies, a consensus whether subjects are sensitive to relative difference 
rather than absolute difference. Relying on happiness studies, one might consider that individual 
well-being is affected by relative difference. In economic theory some models assume that absolute 
difference  drives  subjects’  behaviour  (Fëhr  and  Schmidt,  1999)  whereas  other  refer  to  relative 
difference to predict subjects’ behaviour (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). 
The paper is organized as follows. As we rely on experimental methods the next section provides a 
description of the experimental protocol. Section 3 will be devoted to introduce our results. Last 
section offers a discussion and concludes. 
2. Experimental Protocol 
 
Experimental  sessions  were  conducted  in  spring  2009  at  the  LEEM
10.  Subjects were  randomly 
recruited in a voluntary pool of subjects including more than  1400  candidates for experiments. 
Subjects were mainly students from both sexes, different ages (a scale from 18 to 26 years old) and 
from different universities (scientific or not).  We ruled 12 sessions and 218 subjects participated in 
our experiments. 
We phrased both instructions and game as neutrally as possible (i.e. avoiding any suggestive terms 
such as opponent, destruction...). All instructions were computerised and were displayed during the 
experiment
11. We chose to display instructions during the experiment for two main reasons: First 
because we did not want subjects to anticipate their future satisfaction. Second because the game  
was very easy to understand and thus could be made in very brief time (average time was 35 minutes 
for a session including payment).  
Two roles were randomly distributed in the experiment: role of player A and player B.  Each 
participant can be whether a player A or a player B. As each player A was  randomly associated to a 
                                                           
9 We focus on unflattering social comparisons because we expect the emotion of envy to play a major role in 
destruction actions. First because envy is an omnipresent and invasive emotion triggered by unflattering social 
comparisons and can lead to hostile action (Heider, 1958; Ben Ze’ev, 1992; Smith and Kim, 2007; Celse, 2009). 
Secondly, because some studies support our intuition, e.g. Beckman et al. (2002) reported that envy was highly 
responsible for opposition to Pareto efficient distributions. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) also indicated the key role 
of envy in “burning” decisions.  
10 Laboratoire d’Economie Expérimentale de Montpellier, LAMETA, University of Montpellier I, France. 
11 As instructions were displayed step by step, we did not check subjects’ understanding of the procedures. 
Nevertheless subjects were informed that they could ask privately understanding questions to a monitor by 
raising their hands at every moment of the experiment. player B, there were as many players A as there were players B. Each subject was informed about his 
role and about the role of the associated player (opponent afterwards) at the beginning of the 
experiment. Subjects were then told that the computer will randomly allocate an endowment for 
each player. All subjects knew that feasible endowments ranged from 4€ to 32€. Subjects were also 
informed that only players A could take a decision and had to participate to the next steps. While 
players A were doing the experiment players B were invited to remain silent and were only informed 
of their final payoff (they were not informed about the procedure of the game). From now we will 
present the procedures players A had to fulfil. 
The experiment is single shot and consisted in a succession of six steps (only players A are concerned 
with these steps): 
1.  Each player A was informed about his monetary endowment which was directly expressed in 
Euros and depended on the treatment (see Table 1). 
2.  The subject was invited to evaluate and to declare his satisfaction level
12. The subject had to 
declare
13 on a graduated scale ranging from -50 to +50 how satisfied he was by choosing a 
position on a slider. At the left extreme of the scale, the slider indicated the state “Extremely 
Dissatisfied
14” and at the other extreme the state “Extremely Satisfied”. The middle position 
was valued by 0 and indicated “Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied”
15. A table indicated the 
value of the slider and remained the subject’s endowment. 
3.  Players A received information about their opponents’ endowment and thus realized their 
inferior position.  
4.  Each player A had to evaluate and to declare how satisfied they were after knowing their 
opponent’s endowment (same procedure as previously). 
5.  Each  player  A  was  informed  that  they  could  decide  or  not  to  reduce  their  opponent’s 
endowment
16.  If  a  player  A  decided  not  to  reduce  his  opponent’s  endowment  then  the 
experiment was finished and subjects were paid according to their endowments. If a subject 
decided to reduce his opponent’s endowment, he passed to the next step.  
6.  The player has to indicate how much he wanted to reduce his opponent’s endowment. The 
subject could invest any integer amount from 1 to 10 unities
17, each unity was costly
18 and 
                                                           
12 The subject had to confirm each decision he took. 
13 We trust that asking subjects to report their satisfaction is a reliable method. First, methods based on self -
report measures are recurrent in psychology and often used by emotion theorists. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) argued that “subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences” (quoted from Bosman 
and van Winden, 2002). Second, the satisfaction evaluation procedure did not affect subjects’ payoffs. Thus 
there were neither financial incentives for subjects to report to be satisfied or dissatisfied nor incidence of their 
reported satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) on subjects’ payoffs. Third, recent studies have proved that results 
provided using self-report methods are supported, and thus reliable, by results supplied using physiological 
measures (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007).  
14 All instructions were written in French. An English version of the instructions is supplied in appendix. 
15 See Appendix. 
16 At this stage of the game, the player  was neither informed about the cost of reducing the opponent’s 
endowment nor the amount of reduction. We have chosen to do so in order to differentiate subjects who were 
willing to reduce others income from those who were not.  
17 As the subject must confirm his decision by clicking on a button, player A clearly announced his willingness to 
reduce his opponent’s endowment. As a consequence we did not allow null reductions.  
18 The cost for reducing the opponent’s payoff varied among treatments, see Table 1. We set the cost of 
reduction so as to allow comparisons in terms of actions undertaken by players A between treatments. To fulfill 
that purpose, the cost of reduction represented the same weight in player A’s endowment in each treatment. reduced the opponent’s endowment by a certain amount
19. The player A could simulate the 
impact of his decision on both endowments. If a player A invested 10 unities (maximum 
allowed) to reduce his opponent’s endowment then both players were on the same level, i.e. 
they had the same payoff
20. 
At each step, a table indicated subjects’ decisions (e.g. subject’s endowment, value given at first 
evaluation...). 
As  we  aim  at  investigating  the  impact  of  both  absolute  and  relative  difference  on  individuals’ 
satisfaction and behaviour, we conducted three different treatments. In one treatment entitled Low 
Endowments and Low absolute  Difference (treatment LL afterwards), both subjects received low 
payoffs: 4€ for players A and 8€ for players B. Thus, in that treatment, the absolute gap between 
players A and B’s endowments was low (gap equals 4€). In another one, High Endowments and High 
absolute Difference (treatment HH afterwards), subjects were better endowed: players A received 
16€ and players B 32€. So in that latter treatment both subjects’ endowments and the absolute 
difference  between  players’  endowments  has  increased  (gap  equals  16€).  Although  relative 
difference was kept constant in LL and HH
21, we cannot rely on these two treatments to conclude 
about  the  impact  of  absolute  nor  relative  difference  on  individuals’  behaviour.  Indeed  two 
parameters were changed: the absolute gap between players and their endowments. Hence we 
conducted another treatment, entitled High Endowments and Low absolute Difference (treatment HL 
afterwards), in which players A received 16€ and players B 20€. In the latter treatment, only one 
parameter varied from treatment LL: the endowments attributed to players. The absolute difference 
is kept constant between LL and HL. Introduction of that latter treatment allows us to disentangle the 
effect of both absolute and relative difference on subjects’ satisfaction and behaviour. Then it helps 
in drawing conclusions. 
Table 1: Treatments and parameters used in the experiment. 








Cost for each 
unity 




for  each 
unity 
invested  in 
negative 
action 
LL  4  8  4  2  -0.1×e  -0.5×e 
HL  16  20  4  1.25  -0.4×e  -0.8×e 
HH  16  32  16  2  -0.4×e  -2×e 
Note: e represents the amount invested by the subject in negative actions, ? ∈  1;10 . 
3. Results 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Saying it differently, in order to reduce his opponent’s endowment by one unity each player A had to sacrifice 
2.5% of his initial endowment.  
19 The amount of reduction varied among trea tments, see Table 1. For treatments LL and HH, each unity of  
reduction reduced player B’s initial endowment by 6.25%. for treatment HL, each unity of reduction decreased 
player B‘s initial endowment by 4%.  
20 In order not to exert subjects to invest the maximum allowed, it is important not to allow player A to have a 
superior payoff than player B. Thus even if players A invested the maximum allowed, they could not have a 
superior payoff but could restore equality.  
21 In both LL and HL, each player A’s endowment was half player B’s endowment. Result 1: The majority of subjects exhibits interdependent preferences. 
Support: As Table 2 shows, 87 out of 109 players A report to be affected by learning their opponent’s 
situation. 
Whereas  standard  economic  theory  predicts  that  subjects  will  not  report  any  changes  in  their 
satisfaction  after  learning  their  opponent’s  endowment,  79.82%  of  players  A  report  changes 
(whether positive or negative). Reporting changes in one’s satisfaction is a signal that one exhibits 
interdependent  preferences.  We  observe  that  there  are  significantly  more  subjects  exhibiting 
interdependent preferences than subjects who do not (p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions). 
Whatever the inequality subjects are placed in, the great majority of them report to be affected, 
whether positively or negatively, when hearing their opponent’s higher endowment. Indeed, there 
are  no  significant  differences  among  subjects  reporting  changes  in  their  satisfaction  between 
treatments LL and HL, LL and HH and between HL and HH (p > 0.1, two-sample test of proportions). 
We also use a binary logit model to test if some parameters have an influence on the probability for a 
subject  to  exhibit  interdependent  preferences,  i.e.  to  report  changes  when  evaluating  his 
satisfaction. We measure time subjects took for evaluating their satisfaction
22 and introduce it to our 
analysis. The binary logit model shows no significant results (see Table 3).   
Table  2:  Number  and  proportion  (in  parentheses)  of  subjects  reporting  changes,  or  not,  when  evaluating  their 
satisfaction. 
  Overall  LL  HL  HH 




















Total  109  40  32  37 
 
Table 3: Binary logit model results (probability to exhibit interdependent preferences). 
Binary logit model 
Nb. Obs : 109  





Constant  1.9881 
(1.4155) 












?????𝑙2 (Time for second evaluation)  -0.0085 
(0.0180) 
Note: *indicates statistically significant at 0.1 level, ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
                                                           
22 Before reporting their satisfaction, subjects had to read instructions about how to report their satisfaction. 8 
seconds  after  displaying  instructions  (resp.  12  seconds  for  second  evaluation),  the  graduated  scale  was 
displayed on subjects’ screen. Time was measured, in seconds, while the graduated scale was displayed. Our result underlines the importance and omnipresence of social comparisons. The great majority of 
subjects report their satisfaction to be affected when they learned their opponent’s payoff. By doing 
so, people seem to attach much importance to income comparisons. Our result is consistent to prior 
findings on happiness studies (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998) as well as on 
positional studies (Frank, 1997; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998, 2005; Frank and Sunstein, 2001) which 
tend to corroborate the invasive character of interdependent preferences. Scholars argue that social 
comparisons are inherent to human beings: they have a huge impact on one’s self-evaluation. Ben 
Ze'ev (1992) emphasizes on the key role of comparisons in both self-evaluation and self-esteem. 
Moreover social comparisons can help in building inferences about one self (Festinger, 1954) and 
contributes to ability assessments. Social comparisons lead to a diagnostic: being superior/inferior or 
on success/failure. Hence social comparisons are important because they give information about 
which ingredients are required to perform better or to acquire success. In line with quoted authors, 
Michalos (1985) argue that satisfaction judgements are strongly linked to the existing differences 
between one’s situation and the situation of one’s reference (which can consist of a solely individual, 
a group of persons, aspirations, needs…). 
 
Result 2: The majority of subjects exhibits negative interdependent preferences. 
Support: As Table 4 shows, 60 out of 109 players A report to be negatively affected by learning their 
opponent’s endowment. 
After  being  informed  of  their  opponent’s  better  situation,  55.05%  of  subjects  report  to  be  less 
satisfied  (or  more  dissatisfied).  The  majority  of  subjects  express  negative  interdependent 
preferences.  Indeed,  significantly  most  people  exhibit  negative  interdependent  preferences  than 
positive interdependent preferences and than indifference (resp. p < 0.01 and p < 0.01, two-sample 
test  of  proportions).  This  result  holds  for  treatments  HL  and  HH  but  not  for  treatment  LL.  In 
treatment LL, whereas both differences and endowments are low there as many subjects reporting 
to  exhibit  negative  and  positive  interdependent  preferences  (p  >  0.1,  two-sample  test  of 
proportions). 
Table 4: Number of subjects reporting changes or not in their satisfaction. 
  Overall  LL  HL  HH 






























Total  109  40  32  37 
 
Situations of economic inferiority are, according to psychological researches, usually experienced as 
unpleasant and painful situations by subjects. People dislike unflattering comparisons because they 
reveal their relative inferiority, i.e. their inferiority in one or more than one specific areas. These 
comparisons are to be held responsible for generating feelings of ill-will and displeasure (Smith et al., 
1994; Smith and Kim, 2007). Such negative feelings are prone to damage one self-image and self-
esteem. Hence the negative affective consequences of feelings of inferiority might explain why so many  subjects  declare  to  be  dissatisfied  (resp.  less  satisfied)  when  learning  their  opponent’s 
endowment. Our result is in line with those from Bault et al. (2008). In their experiment, subjects 
reported that situations in which they received a fewer payoff than their opponent were experienced 
as the worst situation. The authors conclude that envy (situations where the subject’s payoff was 
inferior to another subject’s payoff) was experienced as a very negative emotion. In our experiment, 
the majority of subjects consider situations of economic inferiority as very negative ones. 
A  remaining  question  would  be  the  following:  why  are  there  no  significant  differences  among 
interdependent preferences in treatment LL? Indeed when subjects receive low endowments (4€ and 
8€) and, as a consequence, when absolute difference is low (4€) there are no significant differences 
among interdependent preferences. The reason might be found in positional studies. Hirsch (1976) 
argued that as subjects’ wealth increase, subjects become more positional. This would suggest the 
existence of a threshold. Above that threshold, subjects would be more prone to use their income in 
positional goods (leisure, cars…) because they already are sure to satisfy their basic needs (housing, 
basic  consumption  level…).  Hence  according  to  the  author,  we  would  expect  to  observe  more 
dissatisfied subjects in HL and HH than in LL. Indeed once entering in the laboratory subjects are 
willing to win a payoff large enough to reimburse travel costs and time spent in experiments. Once 
subjects have won a certain amount, they may consider income as more positional. Hence subjects 
would be more affected by others’ situations when receiving higher endowments (i.e. in treatments 
HL and HH). We observe such a result. To our knowledge, there is little empirical evidence on such a 
relationship  between  income  and  interdependent  preferences.  Grolleau  and  Said  (2008),  in  a 
positional study, implemented two different questions on income: a low income question and high 
income question. More positional answers were observed concerning the high income question than 
concerning the low income question. 
 
Result 3: Subjects’ interdependent preferences are negatively modulated by subjects’ endowments 
and absolute difference. Then dissatisfaction increases with subjects’ endowments and absolute 
difference. 
Support: We observe that as subjects’ endowments increase there are significantly more people 
reporting negative interdependent preferences (see Table 4). Spearman Rank Correlation tests and 
Partial Least Square (PLS) regressions reveal that absolute difference and subjects’ endowments have 
a significant impact on interdependent preferences. Results from PLS regression are given in Table 6. 
As  players’  endowments  increase,  more  subjects  report  to  be  dissatisfied.  Indeed  there  are 
significantly more subjects reporting to be negatively affected by their opponent’s situation than 
subjects who report positive changes or no changes in their satisfaction (resp. p < 0.01 and p < 0.01, 
two-sample test of proportions) in treatment HL. We observe the same differences in treatment HH 
(resp. p < 0.01 and p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions). Conversely in treatment LL, there are 
no significant differences in terms of interdependent preferences between subjects (resp. p > 0.1 and 
p > 0.1, two-sample test of proportions).  
Are subjects’ interdependent preferences modulated by some parameters? We investigate whether 
there is correlation between the intensity and nature of interdependent preferences subjects exhibit 
and  other  parameters  such  as  the  subject’s  endowment,  the  opponent’s  one,  the  absolute 
difference… The intensity and nature of interdependent preferences subjects express are captured by the variable ?𝑖?????𝑙23. This variable represents the difference between the two reported levels 
of satisfaction. If ?𝑖?????𝑙 is positive, it is because reported satisfaction at second evaluation is 
higher than at the first one (i.e. a subject reports to be more satisfied, or less dissatisfied, after 
learning  his  opponent’s  situation).  The  subject  is  thus  said  to  exhibit  positive  interdependent 
preferences. Results on Spearman Rank Correlation tests are given in Table 5. We observe that four 
variables have a significant correlation with the intensity and nature of interdependent preferences. 
The subject’s own endowment, the opponent’s endowment and absolute difference are negatively 
and significantly correlated to subjects’ interdependent preferences. In other words, as the subject’s 
endowment, the opponent’s endowment and thus absolute difference increase, subjects’ satisfaction 
decrease and more subjects exhibit negative interdependent preferences. Besides time subjects took 
for evaluating their satisfaction at first evaluation is significantly and positively correlated to subjects’ 
interdependent preferences. If we consider time subjects took for evaluating their satisfaction (see 
Table 12), we observe that dissatisfied subjects took significantly less time than others. This last point 
might be interpreted as an evidence of the presence of negative emotions such as envy and anger 
(see above).  
Table 5: Results on Spearman Rank Correlation test made on the nature and intensity of interdependent preferences. 
Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
Nb. Obs                          109  




𝑋? (Player A’s endowment) 
 
-0.2922*** 
𝑋? (Player B’s endowment) 
 
-0.3307*** 
?? (Relative difference) 
 
0.0084 
?? (Absolute difference) 
 
-0.2893*** 
?????𝑙1 (Time for first evaluation) 
 
0.2385** 
?????𝑙2 (Time for second evaluation)  0.1251 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
We have also ordered Partial Least Square (PLS) regressions in order to investigate which parameters 
have more influence on the nature and intensity of interdependent preferences. When the factors 
(i.e. independent variables) are few in number, not significantly redundant (collinear) and have a 
well-understood relationship to the responses then Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) can be a good 
way to turn data into information. The consequences of the use of the MLR are: the variances of the 
estimators are not minimal, then the t-statistics tends towards zero (the probability to accept H0 
increases) and the R-squared tends towards 1. However if any of these three conditions breaks 
down, Multiple Linear Regression is inappropriate. On the contrary, PLS regression is a method based 
on the construction of orthogonal factors in order to improve the quality of the model
24. Thus PLS 
suits perfectly for constructing predictive models when the f actors are highly collinear. It  enables 
regressions without excluding linear variables.  Many variables from our experi ment suffer from 
                                                           
23 ?𝑖?????𝑙 = ???𝑖?????𝑖?? ???????? ?? ?????? ???𝑙???𝑖?? − ???𝑖?????𝑖?? ???????? ?? ?𝑖??? ???𝑙???𝑖??. 
24 See Tenenhaus (1998). collinearity.  For  example  absolute  difference  is  equal  to  the  difference  between  subjects’ 
endowments  and  relative  difference  corresponds  to  the  opponent’s  endowment  divided  by  the 
subject’s  endowment.  Then  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  MLR  introducing  both  the  subjects’ 
endowments and absolute difference (and then relative difference). Using PLS regression, we can 
observe the importance of each variable on predicting the response. We try to investigate which 
parameters have more influence on subjects’ satisfaction (resp. dissatisfaction). We also measure 
time subjects took for evaluating their satisfaction and introduce it in our analysis. Again we refer to 
the variable labeled ?𝑖?????𝑙 to capture the nature and intensity of interdependent preferences. 
Three parameters have a significant and negative impact on subjects’ interdependent preferences: 
the opponent’s endowment, absolute difference and the subject’s endowment (see Table 6). In other 
words,  as  absolute  inequalities  increase  dissatisfaction  increases.  This  result  highlights  the 
importance  of  others’  situations  (and  more  precisely  others’  income)  in  individual  well-being. 
Subjects’ satisfaction is deeply connected to others’ income and to existing absolute differences 
between their own income and others’ income. 
Table 6: Results from PLS regression (variable of importance, weight and direction of the relation). 
PLS regression 
Nb. Obs : 109  














(Player A’s endowment) 
 
-0.5386  -0.5479  1.3194*   
𝑋?  
(Player B’s endowment) 
 








-0.5552  -0.5517  1.3599*   
?????𝑙1  
(Time for first evaluation) 
 
0.1144  0.0694  0.2802   
?????𝑙2  
(Time  for  second 
evaluation) 
0.0405  0.0417  0.0992   
Note: *Statistically significant (VIP > 1). Vectors Wh* (also referred as weighting vectors) consist of the weight 
given to each spectral variable in computation of the latent variable. Vectors Wh* point out the importance of 
each explanatory variable in explaining each factor (latent variable). Vectors Ph reflect the correlation between 
latent variables and explanatory variables. Vectors Ph indicate the direction of the connection. Vectors Ph are 
statistically significant when Ph > 0.4.  
At  first  sight,  this  result  seems  contradictory:  people  should  be  happier  as  receiving  higher 
endowments. Nevertheless this result is observed in positional studies. Hirsch (1976) argued that the 
portion of people’s consumption devoted to positional goods would increase as wealth increases. 
Several quasi-experiments dealing with position  al bias are in line with Hirsch showing that 
people are more positional on attributes for which they enjoy higher absolute levels (Van Kempen, 2003; Grolleau and Said, 2008). This result strengthens Hirsch’s hypothesis by showing that others’ 
situations  have  a  stronger  negative  effect  on  subjects’  satisfaction  as  wealth  and  inequalities 
increase. Furthermore researches on happiness studies lead to the same conclusion: when others’ 
income and inequalities increase, individual well-being decreases. Ferrer-i-Carbonnell (2005) found 
that a person’s satisfaction with life decreases with the income of his reference group. Luttmer 
(2005) showed that when the income of the reference group increases, subjects report lower levels 
of happiness. Finally Layard (2005) drew the same conclusion. He referred on international data and 
suggested  that  above  a  fairly  basic  level  of  income,  the  efficiency  of  income  on  happiness  is 
decreasing. Thus above a certain level of income, any increase of income would give very little 
additional happiness.  
Result 4: On average, one subject out of three chooses to reduce the opponent’s endowment. 
Support: As Table 7 shows, on aggregate, 32.11% of subjects choose to undertake a negative action 
aiming at reducing the opponent’s situation.  
In absence of interactions (and thus in absence of any strategic behaviour), only 35 subjects on 109 
indicate  that  they  were  willing  to  reduce  their  opponent’s  endowment.  Unflattering  social 
comparisons have enough effect on subjects’ behaviour to exert almost a third of them to reduce 
others’ income whereas others cannot retaliate. We previously observed that social comparisons are 
of great importance to subjects’ satisfaction (see result 1). This result strengthens the key role of 
social comparisons on subjects’ satisfaction and behaviour. This result is also far from corresponding 
to the observation of Zizzo and Oswald (2001) who observed that more than half of subjects reduced 
others’ income even by incurring a heavy personal cost. But that result fits with observations from 
Beckman et al. (2002) as well as Bosman and van Winden (2002). Beckman et al. (2002) revealed that 
up to 34% of subjects placed in situations of inferiority opposed to Pareto improvements. Bosman 
and van Winden (2002) observed that only 21% of subjects, participating in a power-to-take game, 
decided  to  destroy  income.  There  are  no  significant  differences  in  terms  of  negative  actions 
undertaken between treatments (p > 0.1, two-sample test of proportions).  
Table 7: Number (and proportions) and intensity of negative actions undertaken by treatment. 
Treatment  Overall  LL  HL  HH 



















Negative actions are not very intense (see Table 7). Whereas subjects could invest up to 10 unities, 
they invest, on average, 3.34 unities. If we compare the amount invested between treatments, we do 
not find significant differences (see Table 8) except between treatments HL and HH (p = 0.061, two 
sided Mann-Whitney U-Test). Whereas the amount invested in HH is slightly higher than in HL, more 
subjects  choose  to  invest  the  maximum  allowed  in  treatment  HL.  Indeed  4  subjects  out  of  14 
invested 10 units in HL whereas only 1 subject out of 11 invested 10 units in HH. This observation tends to support the polarization theory which postulates that conflicts and aggressive acts are more 
likely to emerge when differences between subjects (or groups) are low
25.  
Table 8: Two-tailed Mann-Whitney test on the intensity of negative actions. 
Treatments  HL  HH 
LL  0.276  0.234 
HL  X  0.061* 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
Another result strengthens this explanation. We investigate whether the intensity of negative actions 
was correlated to other parameters. We observe (see Table 9) that the intensity of negative actions is 
significantly and negatively correlated to the relative difference between subjects’ endowments. 
Then as relative difference decreases, negative actions are more intense. Again we observe results in 
accordance with the polarization theory.  
Table 9: Results on Spearman correlation test made on the intensity of negative actions undertaken. 
Spearman Rank Correlation Test 
Nb.Obs                          109  




𝑋? (Player A’s endowment) 
 
0.1152 
𝑋? (Player B’s endowment) 
 
0.0279 
?? (Relative difference) 
 
-0.1967** 
?? (Absolute difference) 
 
-0.0719 
?𝑖?????𝑙 (= ???𝑙2 − ???𝑙1) 
 
-0.0695 
?𝑖?????𝑙??? (=  ???𝑙2 − ???𝑙1 ) 
 
0.0244 
?????𝑙1 (Time for first evaluation) 
 
-0.0111 
?????𝑙2 (Time for second evaluation)  0.0727 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
We  also  compare  the  average  amount  invested  according  to  the  interdependent  preferences 
subjects’ reported (see Table 10). Subjects who report negative interdependent preferences did not 
invest  more  in  negative  actions  than  others  and  conversely  subjects  who  report  positive  or  no 
interdependent preferences did not invest more than others. There are no significant differences.  
Table 10: Two-tailed Mann-Whitney test on the intensity of negative actions according to reported interdependent 
preferences. 
Interdependent preferences  Positive interdependent 
preferences 
Neutral 
Negative interdependent  0.347  0.675 
                                                           
25 See also Abbink et al. (2008) who observed that riots are more likely to emerge when opposing two similar 
groups. They also found that as differences between groups increase, less riots are observed.  preferences 
Neutral  0.825  X 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
Result 5: Negative actions are mostly undertaken by subjects reporting negative interdependent 
preferences. 
Support: As Table 11 shows there are significantly more subjects exhibiting negative interdependent 
preferences who decided to undertake a destructive action. 
Subjects  who  report  to  be  negatively  affected  by  learning  their  opponent’s  situation  choose 
significantly more to reduce their opponent’s endowment than others (p < 0.01, two-sample test of 
proportions). Indeed 22 subjects out of 35 who decided to reduce their opponent’s endowment 
reported  that  they  were  less  satisfied  (resp.  more  dissatisfied)  when  being  informed  of  their 
opponent’s situation.  
Table 11: Number and proportion of subjects taking a negative action by interdependent preferences. 
Interdependent preferences  Subjects taking negative action  Total number of subjects 
Negative   22 
(62.86%) 
60 
Indifference  6 
(17.14%) 
22 
Positive   7 
(20.00%) 
27 




Bosman  and  van  Winden  (2002,  2005)  observed  that  negative  emotions,  such  as  irritation  and 
contempt, drove to destruction. In their experiment subjects who report to experience high levels of 
negative emotions were likely to destroy their endowment. In our experiment we observe a similar 
result. Negative actions are mostly undertaken by subjects who reported to be negatively affected by 
learning  their opponent’s endowment.  A  decrease  in  one’s  satisfaction  can  be  explained  by  the 
experience of negative emotions such as envy or irritation. This result reveals a relationship between 
individuals’ well-being and their behaviour. Time subjects took for evaluating their satisfaction tends 
to corroborate this point (see Table 12). Indeed subjects reporting to be dissatisfied took significantly 
less time for evaluating their satisfaction than satisfied subjects (p = 0.022, two sided Mann-Whitney 
U-Test).  There  are  no  significant  differences  in  time  for  evaluation  between  subjects  exhibiting 
negative interdependent preferences and subjects reporting not to be affected by their opponent’s 
situation  (p  =  0.630,  two  sided  Mann-Whitney  U-Test).  There  are  neither  significant  differences 
between subjects exhibiting positive interdependent preferences and indifference (p = 0.247, two 
sided Mann-Whitney U-Test). Dissatisfied subjects might be influenced by negative emotions (e.g. 
irritation, envy) which are known for being experienced very intensively and arising quickly (Smith et 
al, 1988, 1999). The fact that dissatisfied subjects took less time for evaluating their satisfaction 
might thus be considered as an evidence of the experience of negative emotions. 
Table 12: Average time for evaluation by interdependent preferences. 




34.38  22.98  57.37 
Indifference 
 
35.50  24.68  60.18 
Positive   40.63  24.96  65.59 
Average  36.16  23.82  59.97 
 
Result 6: The probability for a subject to undertake a negative action is significantly and negatively 
correlated to the relative difference between players’ endowments. 
Support: We estimate a binary logit model in order to determine which parameters have an influence 
on subjects’ negative decisions. Table 13 reports the results of the estimation.  
As satisfaction is modulated by absolute difference and as dissatisfied subjects reduced more others’ 
income, one would expect absolute difference to affect individuals’ behaviour. Nevertheless, except 
for relative difference, no variable has a significant impact on the probability for a subject to reduce 
others’ situation. A subject is more likely to reduce his opponent’s endowment when the relative 
difference between both endowments is low. In other words, a subject whose endowment is twice 
inferior  to  his  opponent’s  one  is  more  liable  to  take  a  negative  action  than  a  subject  whose 
endowment is three times inferior. With regards to our results it seems that only relative difference 
exerts an impact on subjects’ behaviour. 
Table 13: Results on Logit regression (probability modelled is subject chooses to reduce others’ payoff). 
Logit Regression 
Nb.Obs                          109  

























?????𝑙2 (Time for second evaluation) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; ** significant at 0.05 level and *** significant at 0.01 level. 
Again  this  result  is  in  line  with  the  polarization  theory.  We  observe  that  as relative  differences 
between subjects are low subjects are more prone to undertake negative actions. Whereas economic 
models focus on absolute differences (Fëhr and Schmidt, 1999) we observe that absolute difference 
only  modulates  individual  satisfaction.  Individual  behaviour  seems  to  be  impacted  by  relative 
difference. Researches on happiness reveal that relative difference has more influence on individual 
well-being  than  absolute  difference  (Clark,  1996;  2003).  Their  results  are  obtained  by  analysing subjective data. But the data they used cannot allow them to disentangle the direct effect of relative 
inequalities on their satisfaction and the effect of their decisions on their satisfaction. Luttmer (2005) 
concludes by saying that “the negative effect of neighbours’ earnings is real and that it is most likely 
caused by a psychological externality, that is, people having utility functions that depend on relative 
consumption in addition to absolute consumption” (p. 990).  
4. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this paper, we implement an experimental protocol in order to investigate the impact of social 
comparisons, through measuring subjects’ interdependent preferences, on individual behaviour. We 
aim at observing if subjects’ satisfaction is affected by unflattering social comparisons and if changes 
in subjects’ satisfaction can explain destructive behaviour. To fulfill that purpose we refer to the 
notion  of  interdependent  preferences.  This  concept  highlights  that  others’  situations  (and  more 
precisely  others’  income)  affect  largely  individual  well-being.  We  identify  and  measure 
interdependent preferences by asking to the subject to report his satisfaction level after learning his 
own endowment and after being informed of his opponent’s endowment. Then subjects have the 
possibility to reduce their opponent’s endowment by incurring a personal cost.  
We observe that social comparisons are of great importance in determining subjects’ well-being. The 
great  majority  of  subjects  (79.82%)  report  their  satisfaction  to  be  affected  when  learning  the 
opponent’s endowment. More precisely the majority of subjects (55.57%) indicate to be dissatisfied 
after receiving information on their opponent’s higher endowment.  
Moreover  subjects’  interdependent  preferences  are  connected  to  others’  situations.  Indeed  we 
observe that subjects’ satisfaction is negatively modulated by their own endowment, the opponent’s 
endowment, the absolute difference (i.e. difference between subjects’ endowments measured in 
absolute terms) and by subjects’ own endowment. Hence as both the opponent’s endowment and 
the  absolute  difference  increase,  more  subjects  exhibit  negative  interdependent  preferences.  It 
seems  that  social  comparisons  have  a  negative  impact  on  individual  well-being  as  income  and 
inequalities increase.  
In our experiment, one subject out of three announces that he is willing to reduce his opponent’s 
endowment. Although subjects are not in interaction with other players (and then not facing others’ 
decisions),  one  third  of  them  choose  to  undertake  a  negative  action  aiming  at  reducing  their 
opponent’s  endowment.  Whereas  this  result  seems  at  first  sight  surprising,  it  strengthens  the 
importance of social comparisons. Indeed the latter have enough impact on subjects’ behaviour to 
induce them to engage hostile actions against others. Besides subjects reporting to be dissatisfied (or 
less satisfied) after unflattering social comparisons undertake significantly more negative actions 
than others.  
Finally, relative difference (i.e. how much the opponent’s endowment is larger than the subject one) 
modulates  subjects’  decisions  to  reduce  others’  endowment.  Indeed  relative  difference  is 
significantly  and  negatively  correlated  to  the  probability  for  a  subject  to  reduce  his  opponent’s 
endowment.  As  relative  difference  increases,  a  subject  is  less  prone  to  engage  a  hostile  action 
toward his opponent. Then both absolute and relative differences affect subjects’ preferences. On the one hand absolute difference has an impact on subjects’ well-being. Indeed subjects’ satisfaction 
is significantly and negatively correlated to absolute difference. On the other hand relative difference 
modulates subjects’ behaviour by influencing subjects’ probability to reduce others’ income. 
This study provides interesting results for happiness research. It corroborates previous results and 
indicates that social comparisons are enough important for subjects to engage behaviour. The study 
helps in disentangling the effect of both absolute and relative difference on subjects’ well-being and 
behaviour. This study can also be particularly relevant for human resources when designing new 
firms’ structure. By implementing financial incentives, managers can generate economic inequalities 
within a firm. These inequalities can trigger unpleasant feelings within some employees and exert 
them  to  sabotage  their  superior’s  work.  More  interestingly,  this  study  can  be  relevant  for 
policymakers. It supplies precious information on the negative consequences of unequal situations 
on  subjects’  attitude.  Results  of  this  study  can  be  used  to  explain  severe  conflicts  observed  in 
developed  countries  (e.g.  riots  observed  in  France  and  in  Greece).  People  may  consider  their 
economically inferior situation as undeserved and, after observing the success of different classes, 
might riot in order to signal the unequal situation.  
This experiment can also serve as a new design for testing the role of complex emotions on individual 
behaviour.  Indeed  whereas  primary  emotions  (joy,  surprise,  anger,  sadness,  fear)  are  easily 
recognizable and well defined by subjects more complex ones (envy, jealousy, shame …) are more 
difficult  to  recognize  and  to  define.  Several  methods  can  be  used  to  assess  the  implications  of 
emotions in decision making. Bosman and van Winden (2002, 2005) used a self-report method which 
consisted in giving a list of emotions and asking to the subject to report the intensity of each emotion 
on a graduated scale ranging from 1 (the emotion is not present at all) to 7 (the emotion is highly 
present). This method suits particularly well to the study of primary emotions because it relies on the 
assumption that subjects have a common and correct definition on given emotions. When asking to a 
subject if he feels envious, it requires that a subject knows the definition of envy. It has been proved, 
concerning the emotion of envy, that people adopt a wrong definition of envy and confound envy 
with jealousy (Smith et al., 1988). Besides emotion theorists commonly agree that ordinary language 
is confusing and misappropriate to the study of complex emotions. To study complex emotions, 
psychologists tend to use more sophisticated self-report questionnaires (Smith et al., 1999) using a 
great number of items and asking to the subject to rate each item. This study relies on a simple 
method which consists in asking to the subject to report his satisfaction level.  
This  experiment  reveals  that  dissatisfied  subjects  reduce  more  others’  income  than  others.  The 
underlying cause for such behaviour could be a desire for equality or envy. On the one hand, subjects 
by reporting how dissatisfied they are, might indicate that they do not accept an unequal situation 
and that they are willing to restore equality. On the other hand, subjects report to be dissatisfied 
because they may feel envy toward their opponent and would appreciate to be in the latter’s shoes. 
In that case, subjects would engage negative actions in order to satisfy their envious feeling. Our 
protocol cannot disentangle both types of subjects. Nevertheless it supplies information on that 
point. If subjects were animated by equalitarian principles they would have invested the maximum 
allowed when reducing their opponent’s endowment so as to restore equality. We do not observe 
such behaviour in our experiment. Indeed only 5 subjects out of 35 (14.28%) have invested the 
maximum allowed in negative actions.  References 
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Welcome, 
We first thank you for accepting to participate to this experiment. This experiment will be paid for 
real and lasts about half an hour. Your final payoff will depend on your endowment and on your 
decisions or on decisions of other participants, depending on your role. All decisions are anonymous 
and there is neither good nor bad answer. All amounts will be directly expressed in euros. Your will 
learn your final payoff at the end of the experiment and it will be paid for real in cash. If you have, 
during  the  experiment,  any  question,  raise  your  hand  and  a  monitor  will  come  to  answer  you 
privately. 
In that experiment, we distinguish two roles: role of player A and role of player B. From now when 
speaking about a player who received the role A, we will refer to player A and to player B for a player 
who received the role B. Roles are fixed during the whole experiment and are randomly attributed by 
the computer.  There are as many players A as there are players B. Each player A will be randomly 
associated to a player B. Whatever your role you will always be associated with the same player. The 
computer is going randomly to allocate an endowment for each player. Possible endowments range 
from 4 Euros (minimum endowment) to 32 Euros (maximum endowment). Only players A are going 
to take a decision. Players B are invited to remain silent during the experiment. 
After each participant has finished reading instructions, the computer will attribute the roles. Your 
role will be displayed on the screen. Then players A will be invited to take a decision, which is going 
to be explained after, while players B will wait. Once all players A have indicated their decision, then 
all players (players A and B) will be informed of their final payoff.  




   Appendix: Computer screen for decision to reduce opponent’s payoff. 
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